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1. See for example com-
mentary by Martin Wolf in
the Financial Times and
other recent coverage:
Financial Times (2015a,
2015b), Gapper (2015),
Oudéa (2015) and The
Economist (2015).
2. As suggested for example
by Financial Times
(2015a).
1  INTRODUCTION
Europe’s banks are in retreat from playing a global
investment banking role. This should not be a sur-
prise. It is an, often intended, consequence of the
regulatory impositions of recent years, notably of
the ring-fencing requirements of the Vickers
Report (2011) and the ban on proprietary trading
by Liikanen (2012), but also including the
enhanced capital requirements on trading books
and other measures. The main concern is that a
medium-sized European country, such as the
United Kingdom or Switzerland, or even a larger
country like Germany, let alone a tiny country like
Iceland or Ireland, would find a global investment
bank to be too large and too dangerous to support,
should it get into trouble1. So, one of the intentions
of the new set of regulations was to rein back the
scale of European investment banking to a more
supportable level.
The European Union, of course, has a much larger
scale than its individual member countries. If the
key issue is the relative scale of the global (invest-
ment) bank and state that might have to support
it, could a Europe-based global investment bank
be possible2? We doubt it, primarily because the
EU is not a state. It does not have sufficient fiscal
competence. Even with the European banking
union and European Stability Mechanism, the
limits to the mutualisation of losses, eg via deposit
insurance, mean that the bulk of the losses would
still fall on the home country (Pisani-Ferry and
Wolff, 2012). Moreover, there would be intense
rivalry over which country should be its home
country, and concerns about state aid and the
establishment of a monopolistic institution. While
the further unification of the euro area might, in
due course, allow a Europe-based global invest-
ment bank to emerge endogenously, we do not
expect it over the next half-decade or so.
So the withdrawal of European banks from a global
investment banking role is likely to continue. That
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will leave the five US ‘bulge-bracket’ banks,
(Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Cit-
igroup and Bank of America Merrill Lynch) as the
sole global investment banks left standing.
The most likely result is a four-tier investment
banking system.
The first tier will consist of these five US global
giants. The second tier will consist of strong
regional players, such as Deutsche Bank, Barclays
and Rothschild in Europe and CITIC in the Asia-
Pacific region. HSBC is in between, with both Euro-
pean and Asia-Pacific roots. The third tier consists
of the national banks’ investment banking arms.
They will service (most of) the investment banking
needs of their own corporates and public sector
bodies, except in the case of the very biggest and
most international institutions (which will want
global support from the US banks) or in cases of
complex, specialist advice. Examples of this third
tier are Australian and Canadian banks, which sup-
port their own corporates and public sector bodies
without extending into global investment banking.
The fourth tier consists of small, specialist, advi-
sory and wealth management boutiques.
Why should it matter if in all the European coun-
tries, the local banks’ investment banking activi-
ties should retrench to this more limited local role?
After all, there are few claims that Australia and
Canada have somehow lost out by not participat-
ing in global investment banking. We review the
arguments in section 4. Before doing so, we take a
closer look at the investment banking market in
Europe. Section 2 investigates the development
of the relative market shares of US and European
investment banks over time. It appears that the US
investment banks are about to surpass their Euro-
pean counterparts in the European investment
banking market. Section 3 examines how the US
investment banks operate in Europe. We find a
typical pattern of a large London head office,
03
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
THE UNITED STATES DOMINATES GLOBAL INVESTMENT BANKING: DOES IT MATTER FOR EUROPE?
3. Governments and other
public sector bodies also
use investment banks to
place their bonds in the
capital markets (eg through
a system of primary
dealers). This is outside the
scope of this
Policy Contribution.
4. SWIFT is the international
payment network for banks.
The broader user commu-
nity also encompasses
banks’ corporate cus-
tomers. After the terrorist
attacks of 9/11, SWIFT
responded to compulsory
subpoenas for data from
the Office of Foreign Assets
Control of the United States
Department of the Treasury.
These subpoenas included
requests for data from the
European sites of SWIFT.
where banks locate their financial experts, includ-
ing traders, and small salesforces in major Euro-
pean capitals. We discuss the policy implications
in section 5.
2   THE RISE OF US AND DECLINE OF EUROPEAN
INVESTMENT BANKS
2.1 The function of investment banks
Investment banks play a key role in financial mar-
kets by bringing together the suppliers of capital
(ie investors) and those that require capital (ie
corporates, governments and households). In this
way, investment banks are the gatekeepers of the
EU capital markets union. The European Commis-
sion, which initiated the capital markets union
project as part of its strategy for the financial
sector, has therefore a keen interest in the proper
functioning of these gatekeepers from an eco-
nomic perspective. But there is also a political
dimension to the role of investment banks, as in
the case of credit rating agencies. Would it be
acceptable for the EU to rely on US players, for
these important components of the financial
system? We return to this in section 4.
On the demand side for capital, corporates make
up the largest group3. The provision of corporate
finance is the traditional métier of investment
banks: helping customers raise funds on capital
markets and giving advice on mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&A). This may involve subscribing
investors to a security issuance, coordinating with
bidders, negotiating with a merger target and liais-
ing with regulators (competition and financial reg-
ulatory authorities) and governments. One of the
main roles of investment banks in M&A is to estab-
lish fair value for the companies involved in the
transaction. They are also able to predict how that
value could be altered (ie what happens to the
value of a company in a number of different sce-
narios and what those potential futures would
mean financially). A pitch book of financial infor-
mation is generated to showcase the bank to a
potential M&A client. If the pitch is successful, the
bank arranges the deal for the client.
While investment banks used to underwrite
almost all equity and bond issues, their role has
now shifted to placing capacity with investors. So
most placements are done on a best-efforts basis;
only rights issues are still underwritten by the
investment banks. Corporates pay for quality and
reputation, which are the key ingredients for an
investment bank’s success.
As both US capital markets and US corporates are
by far the world’s biggest, it is no surprise that US
investment banks are leaders in global invest-
ment banking. However, US investment banks on
Wall Street have close ties with the US government
in Washington DC, as witnessed during the global
financial crisis. In this sector, the US Congress can
easily pass new laws with extra-territorial reach
(eg Sarbanes-Oxley). Next, we have seen
episodes in which US banks and corporates were
acting on stringent orders from Washington (such
as over SWIFT4, Cuba, Iran). What if these orders
turn against Europe? We leave that for Section 4.
2.2 The market shares of US and European
investment banks in Europe
While the US investment banks are the global lead-
ers, what is their share in the European invest-
ment banking market? The Thomson Reuters
investment bank league tables rank investment
banks by market share. These tables typically
cover four major segments: M&A, equity, bonds
and loans (ie syndicated loans). We have calcu-
lated the weighted average of investment banking
proceeds of the top 20 players across these four
segments for Europe (ie the market share in each
segment is weighted by the relative size of that
market segment in total investment banking
business). Global data are usually split into Amer-
icas, EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa), Asia-
Pacific and Japan, but we have only EMEA data.
However, Europe comprises the vast majority of
EMEA investment banking. Data is taken from
Thomson Reuters and covers the period from
2005 to 2015. To select the top 20, we take the 11-
year average across all investment banks, and
use that ranking for all years.
Table 1 provides the detailed market shares of the
top 20 investment banks. It appears that the top
20 covers about 80 percent of the EMEA invest-
ment banking market. Figure 1 summarises the
results. The market share of EU and Swiss invest-
ment banks has declined since 2010/11, while
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Table 1: Market share of investment banks in EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa)
investment banking (in %) 
Investment bank
Re
gi
on
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
1. JP Morgan US 6.5 7 6.4 8.5 8.7 7.9 6.8 7.9 7.3 7.5 7.6
2. Deutsche Bank Europe 6.2 7.6 7 6.9 7.1 7.4 7.3 7.8 7.8 7.6 6
3. Citigroup US 8.1 8.1 7.7 5.9 6.6 5.1 5.2 5.9 6.2 6.4 6.7
4. Goldman Sachs US 4.8 4.7 5.1 5.2 4.9 4.6 5.1 5.3 5.9 5.4 5.9
5. Bank of America
Merrill Lynch
US 4.4 6.9 7.1 6.5 6 5.6 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.8 6.8
6. Barclays Europe 6.8 7.2 6.9 6.9 7.1 7.6 6.8 6.7 6.7 6 6.4
7. Morgan Stanley US 4.5 5.1 5.3 5 5.4 4.5 4.2 4.7 5.1 4.9 5.1
8. BNP Paribas Europe 5.4 5 5.2 5.5 5.5 5 5.7 4.5 5.2 4.7 4.4
9. Credit Suisse Swiss 2.3 3.8 3.7 3.8 4.5 4.6 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.5
10. HSBC Holdings Europe 4.4 4 3 4.4 5.3 5 5.2 5 4.6 5 5.4
11. UBS Swiss 2.2 3.9 4.4 4.2 3.8 4.6 4 3.5 1.9 2.1 2.3
12. RBS Europe 5.3 7.7 8.5 5.7 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.1 2.8 2.5 1.5
13. Societe Generale Europe 3.5 3.1 2.6 2.7 3.3 3 3.4 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.6
14. Credit Agricole CIB Europe 3.5 2.7 2.4 3 2.7 2.6 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.5
15. Rothschild Europe 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 0.7 0.6 1
16. Nomura Japan 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.8 0.1 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1
17. Lazard US 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.9
18. UniCredit Europe 2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.9
19. Commerzbank Europe 2.4 2.9 2.2 1.2 1.6 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1
20. Natixis Europe 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.4
Total top 20 77.7 85.6 83.6 82 81.8 78.7 77.2 76.4 75.1 74.6 74
Share US banks US 37.2 37.9 38.5 38.9 39.7 36.3 34.7 38.7 40.2 41.2 44.6
Share European banks Europe 54.7 51.6 49.8 49.2 50 50.8 53.7 50.1 50.5 49.6 46
Share Swiss banks Swiss 5.8 9 9.7 9.8 10.1 11.7 10 9.2 7.6 7.8 7.8
Share Japanese banks Japan 2.3 1.5 2.1 2.1 0.2 1.1 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.5
Total shares 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Bruegel based on Thomson Reuters.
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the share of US investment banks (the big five and
Lazards) increased from 35 percent in 2011 to 45
percent in 2015. It should be noted that the evo-
lution of the regional market shares reflects partly
the broader banking crisis dynamics. US invest-
ment banks were the first to be hit in the global
financial crisis and declined from 40 percent in
2009 to 35 percent in 2011, but recovered after
the decisive recapitalisation exercise enforced by
the US Treasury. The Swiss decline set in in 2010
and the EU decline in 2011. However, the Euro-
pean share of the investment banking market
remains significant. While the European banks
lose business in the global investment banking
market (Figure 2), they have still a strong, albeit
declining, presence in Europe, serving the many
smaller and mid-sized corporates. 
Nevertheless, Figure 1 shows an underlying struc-
tural trend, whereby EU and Swiss investment
banks are downsizing. If the trend were to con-
tinue, US investment banks would take the prime
spot from their EU counterparts soon, possibly
already in 2016. 
2.3 Global investment banking
To complete our picture of investment banking, we
have also calculated the market shares for global
investment banking and in the other major regions.
For these calculations, we have taken market
shares by investment banking fees. Data is again
taken from Thomson Reuters, but is only available
from 2010 onwards. Figure 2 shows that the share
of American (US and Canadian) investment banks
increased from 58 percent in 2010 to 62 percent
in 2015, while the share of European (EU and
Swiss) banks decreased from 35 to 30 percent
over the same period. This confirms the general
picture of the rise of American investment banks
and the decline of their European counterparts.
Turning to the Americas, the increasing share of
the US investment banks is even more evident.
Figure 3 shows that the relative share of the Amer-
ican investment banking market held by the US
banks from among the top 20 has risen from 63 to
66 percent, while the European share has
declined from 28 to 22 percent. This is in line with
the broader retreat of European banks from the US.
It should be noted that before the global financial
crisis, the European banks had an overly large
presence in the US; so there was a bias towards
the US in the foreign operations of European banks
(Schoenmaker and Wagner, 2013). From the Asia-
Pacific region, only the Japanese investment
banks operate on a global scale. While the Chinese
investment banks are on the rise, they have con-
fined themselves so far to a local role.
Finally, we analyse the Asia-Pacific and Japanese
investment banking market. These are separately
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Figure 1: Investment banks by origin, EMEA
market shares (%) 
Source: Bruegel based on Thomson Reuters.
Note: The figure depicts the relative shares of the EMEA
investment banking market held by the top 20 investment
banks, grouped by origin (EU, US, Switzerland, Japan).
Europe comprises the vast majority of EMEA investment
banking.
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Figure 2: Investment banks by origin, global
market shares (%) 
Source: Bruegel based on Thomson Reuters.
Note: The figure depicts  the relative shares of the global
investment banking market held by the top 20 investment
banks, grouped by origin (Americas (US and Canada),
Europe (EU and Swiss) and Asia-Pacific (Japan)).
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Figure 3: Investment banks by origin, shares of
the American market (%) 
Source: Bruegel based on Thomson Reuters.
Note: The figure depicts the relative shares of the American
investment banking market held by the top 20 investment
banks, grouped by origin (US, Canada, Europe (EU and
Swiss) and Asia-Pacific (Japan))
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Figure 4: Investment banks by origin, Asia-
Pacific market shares (%) 
Source: Bruegel based on Thomson Reuters.
Note: The figure depicts the relative shares of the Asia-
Pacific investment banking market held by the top 20
investment banks, grouped by origin (Americas (US and
Canada), Europe (EU and Swiss), China and Australia. Japan
is not included in the Asia-Pacific market data.
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Figure 5: Investment banks by origin, shares of
Japanese market (%) 
Source: Bruegel based on Thomson Reuters.
Note: The figure depicts the relative shares of the Japanese
investment banking market held by the top 20 investment
banks, grouped by origin (Americas (US and Canada),
Europe (EU and Swiss) and Japan).
Figure 5 shows the Japanese investment banking
market. It highlights the traditionally relatively
closed nature of the Japanese banking market,
with a more than 70 percent market share for
domestic banks. Nevertheless, there is a decline
in the market share of the Japanese investment
banks from 71 percent in 2010 to 67 percent in
2015. This part of the market has been taken over
by the American investment banks, which
increased their market share from 24 to 28 per-
cent during this period.
calculated by Thomson Reuters. Figure 4 shows
some significant and interesting trends. The
shares of the Asia-Pacific market held by US and
European investment banks have tumbled over
this short period. US investment banks have
dropped from 38 to 31 percent and European
banks from 33 to 24 percent. The Chinese invest-
ment banks have now become the largest players
in their own region, with a market share of 41 per-
cent in 2015. This reflects the increasing profes-
sionalism and self-confidence of Chinese
investment banks. These local investment banks
are also better placed to understand, and liaise
with, the Chinese corporates, regulators and
party/government.
HSBC Group is a global bank, with a strong pres-
ence in Europe (42 percent of its total loan book)
and Asia (37 percent of its total loan book). More-
over, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corpo-
ration (the Hong Kong subsidiary of HSBC Group)
is the largest bank in Hong Kong. It would be inter-
esting to see whether it conforms to the declining
path of the European banks or the rise of the Chi-
nese banks. The market share of HSBC in Asia-
Pacific investment banking rose from 1.7 percent
in 2010 to 2.9 percent in 2015. While HSBC is
ranked under European banks (because its head-
quarters are in London), it thus follows the pattern
of Chinese investment banks supplanting their US
and European counterparts. 
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5.  For Citigroup: the Base
Prospectus for Citigroup
Global Markets Deutschland
dated 30 April 2015, and for
JP Morgan: additional infor-
mation from the 2014
Annual Report, to ensure
that all the geographic enti-
ties in the European Union
are included in the dataset.
6. An example of this local
hiring policy is the annual
International Banking Cycle
in the Netherlands, where
the major (US) investment
banks host a joint roadshow
at the Amsterdam and Rot-
terdam universities to hire
graduates.
While the Chinese and Japanese investment banks
are the dominant players in their own markets,
these markets are far smaller than the American
and EMEA investment banking markets. Thomson
Reuters (2016) provides data on total investment
banking fees for the various geographical regions:
Americas $48.6 billion; EMEA $22.1 billion; Asia-
Pacific $12.6 billion; and Japan $3.6 billion in
2015. This reconfirms the overall picture that the
five US investment banks are the global leaders,
with leading positions in the major American and
European markets (see also Figure 2).
3  HOW DO US INVESTMENT BANKS OPERATE IN
EUROPE?
An interesting question is how the US investment
banks operate across Europe. That is difficult to
answer because investment banks, like any large
corporates, are not very transparent about the
precise geographical location of their operations.
But under the recent EU Capital Requirements
Directive (CRD IV), financial institutions must dis-
close, by country in which they operate through a
subsidiary or a branch, information about
turnover, number of employees and profit before
tax. These so-called country-by-country (CBC)
reports allow us to refine the geographical split at
country level. From the 2014 CBC reports of the
five US investment banks, we take the investment
banking activities across Europe and exclude the
commercial banking activities of Citi, Bank of
America and JP Morgan Chase. In two cases (Citi-
group, JP Morgan), some EU countries are not cov-
ered in the main CBC reports. We use additional
documents for these banks5.
3.1 The hub and spoke model
Tables A1 and A2 in the annex contain a detailed
breakdown of turnover and employees in 2014 for
the five US investment banks. Figures 6 and 7
illustrate the aggregate breakdown for the five
banks. The figures show how the US investment
banks apply the hub and spoke model in their
European operations. These banks use the inter-
national financial centre of London as their main
hub (with more than 80 percent of business) with
spokes radiating out to the other larger and mid-
sized European countries. They have no opera-
tions in the smaller markets, such as Austria,
Finland, Portugal and the Baltic States. In central
and eastern Europe, they have only a small pres-
ence in the largest country, Poland.
A few capitals act as sub-hubs. Frankfurt and
Dublin are the larger sub-hubs with more than 2
percent of business. Frankfurt has emerged as
the financial capital of the euro area. The rise of
Frankfurt can be explained by the presence of the
European Central Bank, which has expanded from
monetary policy towards banking supervision.
Moreover, Frankfurt is the financial capital of Ger-
many, the largest and strongest European coun-
try, which reinforced its dominant position during
the euro sovereign crisis. By contrast, Dublin is
located in one of the smaller countries, but has a
favourable tax regime and belongs, together with
the United Kingdom, to the group of English-
speaking countries. Americans might find it easier,
also culturally, to set up office (and home) in
these countries. Finally, Luxembourg and Paris
are smaller sub-hubs with more than 1 percent of
business. 
So, the large London head office contains the vast
majority of an investment bank’s financial experts
and traders, with some further specialists based
in Frankfurt and/or Dublin. The investment banks
have small salesforces in the other main Euro-
pean capitals. These account managers speak the
local language and liaise between the London
experts and local clients, who might prefer to do
business with their fellow countrymen. An inter-
esting detail is that the US investment banks
actively attract financial talent from across
Europe to ensure that the main nationalities (and
cultures) are present in their London teams, and
can also move into senior positions6. Appointing
Europeans to key positions helps in liaising with
European corporates, investors, regulators and
governments, which is an important part of the
investment banking function. 
The hub-and-spoke model is reinforced by the
drive towards regulatory efficiency. The US invest-
ment banks prefer to deal with one regulator for
their European operations. That is obviously the
regulator in the main hub. For prudential matters,
the Bank of England’s Prudential Regulatory
Authority has the supervisory power under the
Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC) over the
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7.  See Financial Times
(2016a).
8. One of the authors partic-
ipated in several negotia-
tions on new financial rules
in Brussels. He always
felt sorry for the EFTA coun-
tries, like Norway and Ice-
land, which were allowed to
attend the meetings
but had little say and no
voting power.
The US investment banks are happy with their cur-
rent presence in London; HSBC also recently con-
firmed it would stay in London and not relocate to
Hong Kong. The Anglo-Saxon culture, in terms of
both the free-market driven business culture and
private residence, suits them well. It is no surprise
to see that the US investment banks are vocally in
favour of the UK staying inside the European
Union7. In contrast, some London-based hedge
funds campaign for Brexit. The volatility following
a Brexit could be a fertile trading ground for hedge
funds. Moreover, a United Kingdom outside the
European Union might be less (over)regulated.
These hedge funds perhaps guess, rightly or
wrongly, that the United Kingdom will strike a trade
deal with the European Union after a potential
Brexit. But the more such a deal resembles the
Norwegian membership of the European Free
Trade Association with passport rights into the
European Union, the more the UK will have to con-
tinue to adopt the full regulatory acquis of the
European Union. The only difference is that the
United Kingdom would have no voting seat at
the negotiation table for new directives and
regulations8. 
4  CONCERNS FOR EUROPE
We now turn to the consequences of the rise of US
investment banks and the decline of their Euro-
pean counterparts. Why should it matter if in all
the European countries, the local banks’ invest-
ment banking roles retrench to a more limited local
role? After all, there are few claims that Australia
and Canada, which are largely served by local
banks, have somehow lost out by not participat-
ing in global investment banking. 
4.1 Regulatory dialogue
There are, perhaps, three inter-related arguments
why leaving global investment banking to the big
five American banks might be problematic. The
first is that this could leave Europe at greater risk
from possibly ill-advised American political or reg-
ulatory intervention. Oudéa (2015), wrote that:
“In the last crisis, American banks came under
intense pressure to reduce their European assets.
Having banks able to finance European compa-
nies is an essential part of the EU’s economic sov-
European operations of the US investment banks.
The UK licence can then be used as a passport
throughout the European Union. Similarly, the UK
Financial Conduct Authority supervises the market
operations under the Markets in Financial Instru-
ments Directive (2004/39/EC; shortly to be
replaced by MiFID II (2014/65/EU)), and offers a
European passport for these activities. Insofar as
the US investment banks have additional sub-
sidiaries across the EU, the respective country
supervisors (eg ECB/Bafin for Citigroup Global Mar-
kets Deutschland AG) have supervisory control
over these subsidiaries.
3.2 Consequences of Brexit
Our analysis shows that London is not only an
international financial centre, but also a gateway
to Europe for the large US and Swiss investment
banks. These banks use their UK banking
licence(s) as passports for their operations
throughout the European Union. That might no
longer be possible in the unfortunate case of a UK
exit from the EU. Although various alternative sce-
narios (from a ‘Norway’ deal to a loose free trade
pact) can be postulated, investment banks have
an overriding interest in safeguarding their Euro-
pean passport. A vote for Brexit in the UK’s 23 June
2016 referendum would be the starting point for
negotiations between the United Kingdom and the
European Union on a new cooperation model.
Such negotiations could easily last several years,
with lingering uncertainty about the outcome
during this period. Investment banks hate uncer-
tainty. Moreover, their clients want to know what
to expect (for example, under which law their
securities are issued). So, investment banks are
making preparations for the relocation of their
business, or parts of their business, and their reg-
ulatory passports, if needed in the case of Brexit.
Speculation is already starting about whether the
investment banks might move their European
head offices to Frankfurt, Dublin, Paris or the out-
sider Amsterdam. In the aftermath of the global
financial crisis, Ireland would not be very keen to
host these large banks. Hosting banks brings not
only benefits (eg employment and taxes), but
also costs in the form of a fiscal backstop to the
banking system (Schoenmaker, 2015). The latter
can in particular be costly for small countries.
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Turnover share >80%
Turnover share between 80% - 2%
Turnover share between 2% - 1%
Turnover share between 0% - 1%
Turnover share 0%
Figure 6: US investment banks, segmentation of turnover across the EU (2014)
Source: Bruegel based on country-by-country reports of the 5 US investment banks.
Note: The figure depicts the segmentation of turnover of the 5 large US investment banks across the EU (calculated as a
weighted average). The main hub is dark blue (share > 80%), the larger sub-hub is purple (share > 2%), the smaller sub-
hubs are light blue (share > 1%). In the remaining EU countries, the investments banks have a minor presence – orange
(between 0 and 1%) or no presence – light green (share 0%).
Employee share >80%
Employee share between 80% - 2%
Employee share between 2% - 1%
Employee share between 0% - 1%
Employee share 0%
Figure 7: US investment banks, segmentation of employees across the EU (2014)
Source: Bruegel based on country-by-country reports of the 5 US investment banks.
Note: The figure depicts the segmentation of employees of the 5 large US investment banks across the EU (calculated as a
weighted average). The main hub is dark blue (share > 80%), the larger sub-hubs are purple (share > 2%), the smaller sub-
hubs are light blue (share > 1%). In the remaining EU countries, the investments banks have a minor presence – orange
(between 0 and 1%) or no presence – light green (share 0%).
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ereignty. Europe’s industrial champions will be at
a serious disadvantage if they cannot rely on
access to capital when their rivals in America and
China can.”
While this danger exists, it was already present
before the withdrawal of European banks from
global investment banking. Since the US dollar and
US financial markets play the central role in the
financial system, the US is in a position to enforce
its demands on acceptable counterparty transac-
tions and to dominate, for good or ill, the interna-
tional monetary policy scene, whether or not the
big five US banks are the only global ‘bulge-
bracket’ banks left standing. 
As we have discussed, Washington has had no
problem enacting far-reaching regulations, such
as Sarbanes-Oxley for corporates, or the leverage
ratio for banks operating in the US (pre-Basel 3).
In the aftermath of the Enron debacle, US Congress
enacted strong corporate governance rules (ie the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), which applies to all
companies (both domestic and foreign) listed in
the US. The usual practice is that companies can
follow the corporate governance rules of their pri-
mary listing, often in the country where they are
headquartered. If they subsequently get a sec-
ondary listing in another market, they do not have
to follow these rules. However, the US decided that
European (and other foreign) corporates with a
secondary listing in New York had to follow the
new Sarbanes-Oxley rules. A controversial require-
ment was that CEOs and CFOs have to sign off on
the accounts. While this rule was strongly resis-
ted by the foreign executives, the US enforced the
rule for all listed companies.
Similarly, the European Commission started to put
clauses in directives to give themselves the
powers to recognise or not the equivalence of US,
Swiss and other countries’ regulation and super-
vision (eg in the Financial Conglomerates Direc-
tive). The European Commission and the US
authorities therefore set up an EU-US Regulatory
Dialogue to discuss bilateral regulation issues9. In
some cases, the parties reached consensus (eg
exemption of European banks from the leverage
ratio for their operations and recognition of US pru-
dential regulation and supervision as equivalent
9.  See
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/
general-
policy/global/index_en.htm. 
10. See Veron (2011).
for financial conglomerates). In other cases, there
is no consensus. A case in point is the accounting
rules. While Europe adheres to the IFRS (Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards), the US
sticks to its US GAAP (General Accepted Account-
ing Principles)10.
A recent issue in the bilateral dialogue is the new
US requirement for an Intermediate Holding Com-
pany (IHC) for large US operations (with more than
$50 billion of assets) of foreign banks. In that way,
the US Federal Reserve can exercise full control
over the US operations of European (and other for-
eign) banks. By requiring separate capitalisation
of the US operations, the rule could reduce bank
profitability at the parent level and induce organi-
sational changes.
4.2 Competition
Five is not a large number. So, the second argu-
ment is that this will leave global investment bank-
ing much more concentrated. Is this not
potentially dangerous? Perhaps, but these five
banks still compete quite ferociously, so margins
are not rising all that much. The current economic
pressures, especially of much greater capital
requirements, impact on the US banks just as
much as on European banks through the Basel 3
framework. What would happen if one, some or all
of these US banks decided to follow the European
banks and to withdraw from providing global
investment banking services in Europe, especially
in London?
To a great extent, greater concentration, higher
margins and less liquid markets are the inevitable
cost of imposing much higher prudential require-
ments. If much more capital is required to back-
stop risk-taking in such activities, then margins
must rise until the capital employed in such activ-
ities earns the (risk-adjusted) equilibrium rate.
This means that weaker competitors must depart,
and concentration rises, until equilibrium is
restored. It is arguable that the sooner such equi-
librium is once again reached, the better. Perhaps
it would be good, rather than bad, if one or two of 
the US big five also packed up and left?
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4.3 European banking becoming parochial?
The third argument is that current developments
are inducing European banks more and more to
concentrate on their national roles and clients in
their investment banking operations, rather than
taking a wider European stance. Table 1 illustrates
that Deutsche Bank and Barclays are the only
Europeans left in the top seven for the EMEA
market. But they are likely to lose their positions,
because Deutsche Bank is currently undergoing a
major reorganisation and Barclays is in the process
of executing the Vickers split. In the investment
banking field, the only pan-European banks will all
soon be American. This has the corollary, for good
or bad, that European national and EU-level author-
ities, such as the European Commission, will have
rather less direct control over them. A key part of
the European financial system is slipping out of the
grasp of the European authorities. 
It seems anomalous that, at a time when the Euro-
pean authorities are trying to establish a banking
union and a capital markets union, the effect of
their regulatory reforms has been to cause EU
banks to concentrate their focus on their national
roles, leaving the US banks as the only pan-Euro-
pean actors on this particular stage. But does it
matter that the European authorities are left
dependent on banks over which they have less
ability to subject them to their demands?
There are concerns about US dominance in Euro-
pean investment banking. These are related to
information advantages and soft relationships.
The rise of Chinese investment banks to support
the international expansion of Chinese corporates
is a strong countervailing power to US and Euro-
pean investment banking dominance. The ques-
tion arises whether US investment banks, as
outsiders, are sufficient knowledgeable about
European corporates. Moreover, what is the loy-
alty of these US banks to European corporates in
times of distress? Next, there are concerns about
corporate culture. Not long after successfully
taming the global financial crisis, US financial
firms resumed their practice of paying high
salaries and bonuses. In contrast, Europe enacted
caps on bonus payments. The large US investment
banks are already trying to exempt their high-
flyers in London from these EU rules, by arguing
that these managers have a ‘global’ role and
should therefore be remunerated by international
rather than European standards11. 
5  POLICY RESPONSE AND CONCLUSIONS
The European banking system is downsizing,
partly because of on-going problems, partly
because Europe is overbanked (Langfield and
Pagano, 2016). That should run its course. The
consequence is that the big US investment banks
will be the sole leaders in the global investment
banking market, as the Europeans, including the
Swiss, are in retreat. We also find that the big five
Americans are getting into pole position in the
European investment banking market.
What should be the policy response? First, we look
at the political side. With the decline of European
banking (both in general and specifically invest-
ment banking), Europe’s hand in the EU-US Regu-
latory Dialogue is diminishing. Nevertheless, the
European Commission is advised to strengthen its
position in the EU-US bilateral negotiations and
keep on viewing its banking industry as a strategic
sector. The emerging role of the European Central
Bank (ECB), on both the monetary and supervi-
sory sides, can be used in these negotiations. Of
the 30 global systemically important banks (so-
called G-SIBS), eight are located in the US and
eight in the EU banking union area. A further four G-
SIBs and the European head offices of the US
investment banks are based in the United King-
dom under the supervisory watch of the Bank of
England. The European Commission, the ECB and
the Bank of England should therefore jointly
develop a strategic agenda with European priori-
ties for their dealings with the US authorities. As in
the US, this strategic agenda should be discussed
with, and supported by, the industry. A strong and
united front would enhance Europe’s position.
Second, we turn to the supervisory side. While
Europe may lose some political clout, the super-
visory implications are not a problem for Europe.
With the move to capital markets union, the Euro-
pean supervisory architecture can handle the
gatekeepers, which are becoming more US-domi-
nated. The European Securities and Markets
11. See Financial Times
(2016b).
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Authority (ESMA) has powers under the Regula-
tion on Credit Rating Agencies (EC/1060/2009) to
licence and supervise the European operations of
the primarily US-based credit rating agencies. Sim-
ilarly, the relevant directives (Second Banking
Directive and Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive) give the relevant European supervisors
(in this case the Prudential Regulatory Authority
and the Financial Conduct Authority) powers over
the London-based European operations of the US
investment banks. 
Third, the large corporates could themselves take
precautions. For the bigger financing operations,
a corporate typically hires a banking syndicate,
which is a group of investment banks that jointly
underwrite and distribute a new security offering,
or jointly lend money to the corporate. European
corporates would be well advised to include at
least one (large) European investment bank in
this syndicate, also in good times when they do
not need them. That could help them in bad times,
when US banks might be reluctant for whatever
reason (including more detached decision-
making). The involvement of a (local) European
investment bank in the syndicate is not only
useful for loyalty but also information reasons.
Because of their local roots, the European banks
have an information advantage over their US
peers, which keep offices in New York and London.
The practice of giving a European investment bank
at least one place in further US-dominated bank-
ing syndicates could help to avoid complete
dependence on the whims of the big US invest-
ment banks. 
Finally, as the underlying financial architecture for
banking union and capital markets union is still
under construction, we do not expect big changes in
the European financial landscape in the short term.
If, however, further steps are taken to complete
banking union as suggested in the Five Presidents
Report (2015), including European deposit insur-
ance with a fiscal backstop by the European Stabil-
ity Mechanism, a truly European banking system
might emerge with strong regional, and potentially
global, players. But that is only speculation.
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ANNEX
Table A1: Segmentation of turnover of US investment banks across Europe in 2014
Country BAML Citigroup Goldman Sachs JP Morgan Morgan Stanley Grand Total
Belgium 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00% 0.08%
Denmark 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.07%
France 0.01% 2.41% 0.00% 0.54% 3.86% 1.12%
Germany 1.02% 9.79% 0.70% 2.49% 0.06% 2.19%
Greece 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.01%
Ireland 1.72% 0.47% 0.03% 1.87% 0.00% 0.92%
Italy 0.37% 0.64% 0.56% 1.36% 0.98% 0.82%
Luxembourg 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 4.66% 0.02% 1.27%
Netherlands 0.30% 0.00% 0.14% 0.00% 0.31% 0.15%
Poland 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 0.10% 0.03%
Spain 0.00% 1.14% 0.92% 0.50% 0.21% 0.51%
Sweden 0.12% 0.45% 0.04% 0.25% 0.00% 0.16%
United Kingdom 95.78% 84.62% 96.59% 87.31% 93.14% 91.91%
Other EMEA non EU 0.68% 0.48% 0.95% 0.48% 1.29% 0.77%
Total EMEA 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Bruegel based on country-by-country reports of the five US investment banks. Note: The data refers to the banks’ investment
banking activities in Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA).
Table A2: Segmentation of employees of US investment banks across Europe in 2014
Country BAML Citigroup Goldman Sachs JP Morgan Morgan Stanley Grand Total
Belgium 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.02%
Denmark 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.42% 0.00% 0.07%
France 0.00% 1.70% 0.00% 0.27% 2.12% 0.97%
Germany 1.19% 6.48% 0.72% 6.39% 0.12% 2.62%
Greece 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00%
Ireland 9.52% 0.32% 0.04% 9.33% 0.00% 3.34%
Italy 0.99% 0.92% 0.45% 2.17% 1.66% 1.08%
Luxembourg 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.16% 0.31% 1.62%
Netherlands 0.17% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 0.12% 0.18%
Poland 0.00% 0.00% 0.54% 0.00% 0.10% 0.13%
Spain 0.00% 2.11% 0.43% 1.00% 0.00% 0.54%
Sweden 0.09% 1.07% 0.07% 0.46% 0.00% 0.26%
United Kingdom 87.06% 83.84% 96.68% 69.78% 94.19% 87.95%
Other EMEA non EU 0.97% 3.57% 0.99% 0.88% 1.36% 1.22%
Total EMEA 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Bruegel based on country-by-country reports of the five US investment banks. Note: The data refers to the banks’ investment
banking activities in Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA).
